KATHMANDU: Nepal’s People’s Movement II in April 2006 was a turning point in the nation’s political history. It emerged after King Gyanendra’s royal takeover on February 1, 2005, when he dismissed the elected government and assumed direct control, suspending democratic freedoms and suppressing political opposition. This move sparked widespread discontent, which culminated in the 19-day popular uprising. Political parties, civil society, and even the Maoist insurgents united to demand the restoration of democracy, constitutional monarchy, and political inclusiveness. The movement forced the king to reinstate Parliament, ultimately leading to the abolition of the monarchy and the establishment of a federal republic. Despite the return of democracy, the new political system still faced challenges in meeting the public’s expectations. Here is an explainer on Nepal’s People’s Movement II, covering key events, figures, and its lasting impact.
What led to King Gyanendra’s royal takeover on February 1, 2005, and how did it set the stage for People’s Movement II?
The royal takeover by King Gyanendra on February 1, 2005, was a dramatic moment in Nepal’s turbulent political history. It represented the culmination of mounting political instability, frustration with the parliamentary system, and the intensifying Maoist insurgency. However, instead of resolving the crisis, the King’s authoritarian move laid the groundwork for a nationwide democratic uprising known as People’s Movement II (Jana Andolan II).
To understand the context, we must go back to the early 2000s. After the tragic royal massacre of 2001, Gyanendra ascended the throne under a cloud of controversy and suspicion. The country was already in turmoil due to the Maoist insurgency, which had begun in 1996 and had claimed thousands of lives by the early 2000s. The political parties were fragmented, and frequent changes in government contributed to widespread public disillusionment with parliamentary democracy.
King Gyanendra had twice dismissed elected prime ministers (in 2002 and 2003), citing their inability to hold elections and curb the insurgency. He began appointing loyalists as prime ministers, bypassing constitutional norms. The culmination came on February 1, 2005, when the King dismissed the Deuba government, declared a state of emergency, suspended civil liberties, censored the press, and imprisoned political leaders and civil society activists. He took full control of the executive powers, claiming he would restore order within three years.
Domestically and internationally, this move was met with outrage. India, the U.S., and European nations cut military aid and issued strong condemnations. Inside Nepal, the King’s crackdown on political freedom and press rights fueled resentment. Civil society, political parties, students, and professionals gradually began to unite against what they viewed as a return to absolute monarchy.
Despite the King’s attempt to project efficiency and stability, his regime failed to address the insurgency or gain public legitimacy. His centralization of power and repression deepened Nepal’s political crisis and catalyzed a rare unity among the deeply divided political parties. This momentum ultimately led to the formation of the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) and the historic 12-point agreement with the Maoists on November 22, 2005 — an unprecedented alliance between former rivals.
The King’s attempt at “guided democracy” had the opposite effect: it reignited the democratic spirit in the masses and laid the foundation for the People’s Movement II. It also reframed the national conversation — from restoring democracy to questioning the very existence of monarchy. The movement would go on to challenge not only the King’s rule but the foundations of Nepal’s centuries-old, centralized monarchy.
In essence, the February 1 royal takeover was both a symptom of Nepal’s deep political malaise and the spark that ignited a people’s revolution. It discredited monarchy irreparably and unified previously splintered democratic and leftist forces into a powerful alliance for change.
What role did the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) play in organizing People’s Movement II?
The Seven Party Alliance (SPA) was the principal political force that mobilized and coordinated the People’s Movement II (Jana Andolan II) against King Gyanendra’s direct rule. Formed in response to the King’s February 1, 2005, royal takeover, the SPA brought together Nepal’s major parliamentary parties, previously fragmented and discredited, into a united democratic front. This strategic alliance not only rejuvenated public trust in political parties but also provided leadership, legitimacy, and structure to the mass uprising that unfolded in April 2006.
The SPA included the following political parties: Nepali Congress (NC), Communist Party of Nepal–Unified Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML), Janamorcha Nepal, Nepal Sadbhawana Party (Anandidevi), Nepal Workers and Peasants Party, United Left Front, and CPN (Unity Center-Masal). These parties, despite deep ideological and historical differences, came together with a shared objective: to restore democracy and end monarchical autocracy.
Initially, the SPA’s strategy focused on nonviolent resistance and civil disobedience. Political leaders issued statements, held press conferences, and mobilized supporters through underground channels as many were either detained or under surveillance. Over time, they began to build public momentum through small-scale protests and symbolic events, calling for the restoration of civil liberties, press freedom, and multiparty democracy.
The real turning point came on November 22, 2005, when the SPA signed a 12-point agreement with the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) — a historic deal that redefined the political landscape. The agreement committed both sides to fight jointly against autocracy and to embrace multiparty democracy, human rights, and inclusive governance. For the first time, the Maoists and parliamentary parties were on the same page, a move that bridged the urban-rural divide in Nepal’s democratic struggle.
In early 2006, the SPA began preparing for a decisive confrontation. It announced a nationwide general strike and series of mass protests to begin on April 6, 2006. The slogan was simple and powerful: “Loktantra, not just democracy.” People from all walks of life—students, lawyers, doctors, teachers, workers, and business owners—joined the movement. The SPA coordinated logistics, issued joint statements, and engaged with the media despite heavy restrictions. Its top leaders, including Girija Prasad Koirala and Madhav Kumar Nepal, emerged as symbols of resistance.
The SPA’s disciplined leadership ensured the protests remained largely peaceful despite brutal crackdowns by the security forces. Its alliance with the Maoists gave the movement both nationwide reach and credibility. And crucially, the SPA maintained international diplomatic engagement, ensuring that countries like India, the U.S., and the EU continued to exert pressure on King Gyanendra.
By April 24, 2006, faced with unrelenting public pressure, the King was forced to back down and reinstate the dissolved House of Representatives. This was a key victory for the SPA, which then took charge of steering Nepal towards a new political era — one that would ultimately lead to the abolition of the monarchy and the declaration of a republic in 2008.
The SPA was far from perfect, and internal rivalries would later resurface, but during People’s Movement II, it played a vital role in uniting Nepal’s fractured democratic forces and delivering the final blow to royal autocracy.
How did the Maoists and the 12-point agreement transform the nature of the movement?
The Maoists, who had been waging a violent “People’s War” since 1996, were a crucial but controversial player in Nepal’s politics. Their strategic alliance with the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) through the 12-point agreement signed in November 2005 in New Delhi was a turning point in the country’s democratic struggle. This pact effectively merged the armed insurgency with the non-violent democratic movement, reshaping Nepal’s political landscape and laying the foundation for People’s Movement II.
The Maoists had long rejected parliamentary politics, blaming the post-1990 system for exclusion, inequality, and feudal oppression. They envisioned a “New Democratic Republic” and demanded structural reforms like federalism, secularism, and proportional inclusion. However, by 2005, the insurgency had reached a military and political stalemate. The monarchy’s direct rule also posed a common threat to both Maoists and parliamentary parties. This convergence of interests led to a strategic recalibration.
The 12-point agreement was a mutually beneficial compromise. The SPA agreed to a Constituent Assembly to draft a new constitution—one of the Maoists’ key demands. In return, the Maoists committed to multiparty democracy, human rights, and political pluralism. Both sides pledged to conduct a peaceful, united movement against the monarchy. The agreement also laid out a vision of a restructured state, inclusive governance, and the eventual integration of Maoist fighters.
This pact sent shockwaves across Nepal. For the first time, previously polarized actors were united in purpose. Urban political activists and rural rebel supporters came together under a shared democratic banner. The Maoists’ participation ensured the movement wasn’t confined to Kathmandu—it became a truly national uprising, with simultaneous mobilizations in remote districts and the capital.
The Maoists also provided critical logistical support and communication networks, helping to mobilize massive turnouts despite curfews and repression. Their backing increased the SPA’s leverage against the monarchy and allowed the movement to withstand violent suppression by state forces.
Crucially, the agreement signaled a shift in the Maoists’ strategy—from armed rebellion to a political mainstream. Although suspicions remained about their true intentions, the alliance helped bring them into the democratic fold, eventually leading to their participation in the peace process and Constituent Assembly elections.
The 12-point agreement, therefore, was not just a tactical move—it was the blueprint for Nepal’s political transformation. It signaled the beginning of the end of the monarchy and the rise of an inclusive republican agenda. It transformed People’s Movement II from a campaign for democracy into a struggle for a fundamentally restructured state.
What happened during the April 2006 protests and what were the key turning points?
The April 2006 protests, known as People’s Movement II (Jana Andolan II), were a massive, sustained uprising against King Gyanendra’s authoritarian rule. Sparked by years of frustration with monarchy and ineffective democracy, and propelled by the 12-point SPA-Maoist agreement, the protests lasted for 19 days—from April 6 to April 24, 2006—and led to the restoration of the House of Representatives and, ultimately, the end of the monarchy.
The SPA declared a nationwide general strike starting April 6. Despite curfews, arrests, and bans on public gatherings, the call was met with unprecedented public support. Hundreds of thousands took to the streets of Kathmandu, Lalitpur, Pokhara, Biratnagar, Nepalgunj, and dozens of other towns. Protesters demanded the end of absolute monarchy, restoration of democracy, and the formation of a Constituent Assembly.
Security forces responded with brutality. The army and police used tear gas, batons, rubber bullets, and live ammunition. Scores of people were killed and thousands injured. Yet, the protests intensified daily. Citizens defied round-the-clock curfews. Doctors, journalists, teachers, lawyers, engineers, women’s groups, and business owners all joined en masse. This wasn’t just a party-led movement—it became a people’s uprising.
Key turning points included:
This was hailed as a monumental victory. The SPA returned to power, and within months, the Parliament stripped the King of his powers. People’s Movement II had succeeded where earlier efforts failed: it forced a recalcitrant monarch to retreat and opened the door to republicanism and structural reforms.
What was India’s role during the 2006 People’s Movement, and why did its mediation efforts through Karan Singh fail?
India, as Nepal’s influential neighbor and a long-time political stakeholder, played a critical but controversial role during the 2006 People’s Movement (Loktantra Andolan). Historically involved in Nepal’s political affairs—often as a broker or backer—India watched with growing concern as King Gyanendra’s direct rule after February 1, 2005, plunged Nepal into political instability and escalated the Maoist insurgency.
By early 2006, with Kathmandu in turmoil and international condemnation mounting, India intensified its diplomatic efforts. It feared that a prolonged crisis in Nepal could lead to regional instability, a refugee influx, and increased Chinese influence. Thus, India aimed to mediate a political solution that would restore democracy without a violent overthrow of the monarchy.
India’s most visible intervention came in April 2006, when it dispatched Dr. Karan Singh, a senior Indian politician, royal family member (linked to Nepal’s Shah dynasty through marriage), and then India’s special envoy. His mission was to negotiate a compromise between King Gyanendra and the Seven Party Alliance (SPA). The idea was to convince the king to hand power back to the political parties and form a multi-party government, possibly under constitutional monarchy.
Karan Singh arrived in the midst of mass protests (April 20, 2006) that had paralyzed the country. Backed by India’s Ministry of External Affairs, his message to Gyanendra was to step back gracefully, restore the House of Representatives, and accept a limited ceremonial role. Simultaneously, he urged the political parties to accept a middle path, preserving the monarchy in some form.
However, this diplomatic mission failed—and for several reasons:
Gyanendra’s Intransigence: The king underestimated the scale and seriousness of the uprising. Emboldened by the military and conservative supporters, he believed the protests would fizzle and that India would ultimately support a face-saving settlement preserving his authority.
Shift in Public Mood: The public no longer wanted compromise. After years of palace authoritarianism and suppression, the sentiment on the streets was decisively republican. Protesters no longer demanded power-sharing but outright abolition of the monarchy.
Parties-Maoist Agreement: By 2005, the Seven Party Alliance had already signed a 12-point agreement with the Maoists in Delhi. This agreement, tacitly backed by India, had united democratic and revolutionary forces against the king. Returning to a “monarchical compromise” contradicted this growing momentum for a republic.
Ambiguity in India’s Policy: India’s initial hesitation to decisively back republicanism created mixed signals. While Karan Singh proposed dialogue, other Indian diplomats and agencies reportedly engaged with both monarchists and Maoists. This lack of policy coherence weakened the effectiveness of mediation.
Ultimately, Karan Singh’s proposal—a compromise retaining the monarchy—was rendered obsolete within days. On April 24, 2006, King Gyanendra was forced to reinstate the dissolved Parliament amid massive protests and growing isolation. His speech came too late to save the monarchy in its prior form.
India’s role, though diplomatically significant, failed to alter the revolutionary tide. In the long run, India adapted to Nepal’s new political reality, supporting the peace process and the 2008 Constituent Assembly elections. But the episode demonstrated the limits of external mediation when domestic legitimacy is shattered—and how the people’s will can override even the strongest diplomatic calculations.
How did the restoration of Parliament in April 2006 lead to major political changes in Nepal?
The restoration of the House of Representatives on April 24, 2006, was more than a symbolic act—it triggered the most profound political changes in Nepal’s modern history. It marked the beginning of the end of monarchy, the transition to a federal republic, and the start of a new constitutional era. However, it also exposed the tension between high public expectations and the realities of political compromise.
Once restored, Parliament immediately moved to reclaim sovereignty from the monarchy. On May 18, 2006, the House issued the “House of Representatives Proclamation,” a sweeping declaration that effectively stripped King Gyanendra of all political powers. It renamed the Royal Nepal Army to Nepal Army, removed the King’s supreme commander role, ended royal privileges, and placed the military under civilian control. This act was dubbed the “second declaration of independence“ by civil society.
The Parliament also established a Comprehensive Peace Process, laying the groundwork for formal negotiations with the Maoists. Talks began in mid-2006 and culminated in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in November 2006. This ended the 10-year civil war, began the disarmament process, and brought the Maoists into mainstream politics.
A key part of the agreement was the election of a Constituent Assembly, tasked with drafting a new constitution. For the first time, the people would directly shape the political structure of the country. The interim constitution (2007) declared Nepal a secular state and paved the way for the monarchy’s formal abolition in 2008.
At the same time, the movement raised hopes for deep reforms—federalism, proportional inclusion, justice for war victims, and economic transformation. But implementation was slow and uneven. Political parties resumed their rivalries. Corruption scandals emerged. Public discontent simmered as governance failed to match revolutionary promises.
Still, the April 2006 restoration was the hinge moment. It ended centuries of monarchical dominance and created the framework for a new republic. It also revealed the gap between a democratic opening and the long, difficult process of building an inclusive, accountable state.
What kind of democracy emerged after People’s Movement II, and how was it different from the 1990 system?
The democratic system that emerged after People’s Movement II in 2006 was significantly more transformative and ambitious than the constitutional monarchy-based parliamentary democracy established in 1990. While the 1990 movement had restored civil liberties and multiparty elections, it kept the monarchy as a constitutional figurehead and failed to address deeper structural inequalities. In contrast, the post-2006 system aimed to dismantle the monarchical order entirely and build an inclusive, secular, and federal republic grounded in proportional representation.
One of the first markers of this shift was the May 18, 2006 Declaration by the reinstated House, which took away all political powers of the King, symbolically ending centuries of monarchical supremacy. Unlike in 1990, where the monarchy was preserved through compromise, the 2006 movement resulted in a clear break with the past.
The interim constitution of 2007 declared Nepal a secular, inclusive, and democratic republic, a sharp departure from the Hindu Kingdom identity it had long held. The Maoists, now included in the peace process, helped steer the agenda toward deeper structural reforms that resonated with historically marginalized groups—Madhesis, Janajatis, Dalits, and women—who had seen limited gains under the 1990 arrangement.
Another major difference was the commitment to a Constituent Assembly tasked with drafting a new constitution. While the 1990 constitution was written by an appointed commission, the post-2006 process emphasized popular sovereignty through direct elections. This democratic innovation sought to legitimize the new state structure through public mandate.
Moreover, the political discourse shifted beyond mere electoral democracy to embrace substantive inclusion, federalism, and identity-based representation. The failure of the 1990s to deliver economic justice, curb corruption, and bring marginalized voices into governance had fueled the Maoist insurgency and public disillusionment. The new system sought to redress these failures by institutionalizing power-sharing and affirmative action.
However, the new democracy also faced enormous challenges. Political instability, frequent government changes, and inter-party wrangling delayed the constitution-making process. The first Constituent Assembly (2008–2012) failed to deliver a constitution, leading to its dissolution. It took until 2015 for a new constitution to be promulgated, following the 2013 elections.
In essence, the democracy that emerged post-2006 was broader in ambition, more representative in design, and revolutionary in intent compared to the 1990 model. But its implementation exposed the complexities of state restructuring in a deeply unequal society. While it succeeded in formally ending monarchy and embedding progressive values in law, people’s expectations for justice, accountability, and effective governance remain partially unmet even today.
How did inclusion and identity-based politics gain momentum after the movement?
One of the most far-reaching impacts of People’s Movement II was the mainstreaming of inclusion and identity-based politics. The movement, especially through its alliance with the Maoists, pushed historically excluded groups to the forefront of national discourse. For the first time, terms like inclusion, proportional representation, and identity rights became central to Nepal’s political agenda.
Under the unitary, Hindu monarchical state, Nepal had long marginalized Madhesis, Janajatis (indigenous groups), Dalits, Muslims, and women. The 1990 constitution, though democratic, failed to dismantle these structural discriminations. Political leadership remained overwhelmingly high-caste, male, and hill-centric. After 2006, a concerted effort began to change this reality.
The interim constitution of 2007 explicitly adopted inclusion as a constitutional value. It mandated proportional representation in state organs, recognized social justice as a state responsibility, and promised affirmative action for underrepresented groups. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) also committed to restructuring the state to address historical exclusion.
This political shift encouraged mobilizations across identity lines. The Madhes Movement of 2007 and 2008 demanded autonomy and equal representation for the southern plains, where Madhesi communities had long faced discrimination. Janajati groups called for ethnic federalism, while Dalit movements demanded dignity and representation.
Quotas were introduced in civil service recruitment. The 2008 Constituent Assembly was designed to reflect Nepal’s diversity through a mixed electoral system. As a result, it saw unprecedented participation of women (33% quota), Madhesis, Janajatis, and Dalits.
Political parties responded to this new reality by forming identity-based alliances and adjusting their agendas. New parties emerged—from Madhesi Janaadhikar Forum to Federal Socialist Party—to represent these communities more directly. Even traditional parties like Nepali Congress and CPN-UML were forced to open leadership spaces and policy platforms to marginalized voices.
Yet, the rise of identity politics also triggered backlash. Some sections feared that excessive emphasis on identity could fragment national unity. Debates around ethnic-based federalism vs. geography-based federalism became contentious during constitution drafting. The 2015 constitution compromised on many demands, leading to protests and dissatisfaction, especially in the Madhes.
Still, inclusion remains a core pillar of Nepal’s new democracy. It changed how the state imagines citizenship—not just as an individual relationship with the state, but as a reflection of collective identities and historical injustices. While challenges persist in implementation, the post-2006 era firmly established inclusion as a democratic imperative, not just a policy option.
What is proportional representation and how did it reshape Nepal’s electoral system?
Proportional Representation (PR) refers to an electoral system where political parties gain seats in proportion to the number of votes they receive. Unlike the traditional First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) system where only the candidate with the most votes wins, PR ensures a more inclusive and representative parliament by allowing multiple parties to gain seats based on their share of the national vote. Nepal adopted a mixed electoral system—a blend of PR and FPTP—after the 2006 movement, fundamentally reshaping its political institutions.
This shift was driven by the need to correct historical imbalances in political representation. Under the old system, upper-caste men from the hill regions dominated Parliament. Women, Dalits, Janajatis, Madhesis, and Muslims were severely underrepresented. The Maoists and marginalized groups demanded a system that better reflected Nepal’s ethnic, regional, and gender diversity.
In the 2008 Constituent Assembly election, Nepal implemented a 60:40 split, with 60% of the seats filled through PR and 40% through FPTP. Under the PR system, parties submitted closed lists of candidates that had to meet mandatory quotas—for example, at least 33% women, and proportional inclusion of marginalized groups.
This system significantly changed the composition of the legislature. In 2008, more than 50% of elected representatives came from marginalized backgrounds. Women made up over 32% of the assembly. Dalits, Janajatis, and Madhesis had unprecedented levels of representation, altering the elite-dominated landscape of Nepali politics.
PR also allowed smaller parties to gain parliamentary seats, reducing the dominance of major parties and encouraging coalition politics. This was seen as a democratizing move, though it also led to political fragmentation and unstable governments.
The mixed system continued in the 2013 and 2017 elections and remains in place today. Though the FPTP portion still favors established parties and wealthier candidates, the PR component acts as a corrective, ensuring greater diversity in parliament.
However, the system is not without flaws. Critics argue that parties manipulate their closed lists, favoring loyalists over grassroots activists. The accountability of PR-elected members to the public is also weak, as voters do not choose individual candidates. Despite these issues, proportional representation remains one of the most progressive legacies of People’s Movement II.
It embodies the post-2006 commitment to democratic inclusion, and while not perfect, it has played a crucial role in making Nepal’s legislature more representative of its diverse population.
How did federalism and the restructuring of the state transform Nepal’s governance?
One of the most radical outcomes of the 2006 People’s Movement was Nepal’s transformation from a unitary monarchy to a federal democratic republic. This shift was not merely administrative—it reflected a deeper political and social demand to decentralize power and correct historic exclusion based on geography, ethnicity, and caste. Federalism became the cornerstone of Nepal’s new political identity after the fall of King Gyanendra’s rule.
The demand for federalism gained momentum especially after the inclusion of the Maoists and Madhesi forces in the political mainstream. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2006 and the Interim Constitution of 2007 both recognized federalism as essential to restructuring the state. The idea was to move away from Kathmandu-centric, hill-upper caste dominated governance and empower local and provincial actors.
In 2015, the new constitution officially declared Nepal a federal democratic republic with three tiers of government: federal, provincial, and local. Seven provinces were established, and local bodies were restructured into 753 units (metropolitan cities, sub-metropolitan cities, municipalities, and rural municipalities). Elections were held at all three levels in 2017—the first such exercise in Nepal’s history.
Federalism had multiple goals: enhance public participation, bring governance closer to people, ensure development equity, and enable minority and regional representation. The federal model introduced provisions for provincial assemblies, chief ministers, and autonomous planning and budgeting, marking a significant departure from the previous centralized system.
One of the most celebrated aspects of this restructuring has been the empowerment of local governments. Local elected officials—mayors, deputy mayors, ward chairs—now manage a range of public services from education to health and infrastructure. Fiscal transfers from the federal government and the power to raise local taxes have allowed municipalities to directly shape local development agendas.
Despite these gains, the transition has not been without challenges. There is confusion over jurisdiction, delays in law-making, inadequate human resources in provinces, and bureaucratic resistance to devolution. Provincial governments often complain of limited autonomy, as key powers and resources still rest with the federal government. In many cases, the implementation of federalism has been top-down, lacking local consultation and ownership.
Still, federalism represents a profound shift in Nepal’s governance philosophy. It decentralizes authority, embeds inclusion in structure, and provides a framework to accommodate Nepal’s vast diversity. While far from perfect, it is a foundation upon which a more equitable and accountable democracy can be built—one that reflects the spirit of the 2006 movement’s call for restructuring the state.
Has post-2006 democracy fulfilled the expectations of the people?
The People’s Movement II of 2006 raised immense hopes for a more inclusive, accountable, and prosperous Nepal. It promised not just the end of authoritarianism and monarchy, but the birth of a just republic rooted in social justice, inclusion, federalism, and equality. Nearly two decades later, public sentiment reflects a complex mix of achievement, disillusionment, and enduring aspiration.
On the one hand, Nepal has made historic progress. The monarchy was abolished. A new constitution was promulgated in 2015, enshrining rights to inclusion, secularism, federalism, and proportional representation. Marginalized groups have achieved greater political visibility than ever before. Local governance has been revitalized, and democratic elections are now regularly held at three levels.
But on the other hand, many expectations remain unmet. A central complaint is that political leaders—despite their revolutionary rhetoric—have failed to deliver good governance. Corruption is rampant, service delivery remains weak, and public trust in institutions is low. The political class is often seen as self-serving, more interested in power-sharing than in transformational reform.
Unemployment, inflation, and lack of economic opportunity have fueled frustration, especially among youth. Despite constitutional guarantees, inclusion is often tokenistic. Many Dalits, Madhesis, and Janajatis remain economically and socially marginalized. Similarly, gender equity laws have not translated into lived equality, with patriarchal norms and violence against women persisting.
Federalism, though structurally implemented, has faced slow execution. Provinces lack resources and authority to meaningfully govern. Political wrangling between federal, provincial, and local bodies hinders development. Many feel that while power was redistributed on paper, in practice Kathmandu’s dominance remains intact.
In the 2022 and 2024 elections, voter turnout declined, reflecting growing apathy. Young people increasingly migrate abroad, not just for jobs but out of disillusionment with domestic prospects. Social media is rife with criticism of political elites, including those who once led the 2006 movement.
Still, it would be wrong to declare post-2006 democracy a failure. Nepal’s political evolution has opened previously closed doors, created space for dissent, and empowered communities once invisible in policymaking. The system now provides mechanisms for correction, protest, and participation—something absent under monarchy.
In essence, Nepal’s post-2006 democracy is a work in progress—a deeply flawed, uneven, yet fundamentally transformative system. The people’s expectations may not have been fully met, but the foundations of a more inclusive and participatory republic have been laid. The challenge ahead lies in delivering governance with integrity, fulfilling constitutional promises, and translating structural reforms into everyday justice.
