KATHMANDU: When CPN (UML) Chairman K.P. Sharma Oli assumed office as Nepal’s Prime Minister on July 15, 2024, he faced a monumental challenge: mending his strained relationship with its powerful southern neighbor, India. Despite repeated overtures, including formal invitations to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the diplomatic thaw Mr. Oli hoped for has yet to materialize for nine months.

The relationship between the two leaders, bound by history yet fraught with mistrust, remains in limbo. Since Oli’s return to power, the lack of meaningful engagement from India has highlighted the deep-seated mistrust between the two leaders. Despite two face-to-face meetings with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi—first in New York and later in Bangkok—Oli has been unable to secure even a symbolic gesture of goodwill, such as a visit to India by himself or a visit to Nepal by the Indian Prime Minister Modi.

Diplomatic efforts between Nepal and India have been increasingly undermined by deep-seated mistrust and strategic tensions. The implementation of a Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) project with China in Jhapa in December 2024, near India’s sensitive Siliguri Corridor—commonly referred to as the Chicken’s Neck—has further widened the rift. This stretch of land, critical to India’s security, has become a flashpoint, amplifying New Delhi’s concerns over Nepal’s growing alignment with Beijing and carrying its security interests and undermine their concern.

High-level sources reveal that deliberate miscommunication by Nepali leaders to India, conflicting narratives, and perceived insults from Nepal’s leadership, including Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli and Foreign Minister Arzu Rana Deuba, have only fueled India’s reluctance to engage. In stark contrast to this fraught dynamic, diplomacy requires subtlety, consistency, and above all, trust—qualities that are glaringly absent in the current equation.

The latest meeting between the two leaders occurred on the sidelines of the The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) Summit in Bangkok, where they spoke for 35 minutes in private. Yet, like their first encounter in New York during the United Nations General Assembly in September 2024, the meeting yielded little. While Oli described the talks as a success, the absence of concrete agreements or initiatives painted a different picture.
Modi’s refusal to attend Nepal’s Sagarmatha Sambad program—citing prior commitments in Europe—delivered another blow. Meanwhile, in the days following their Bangkok discussion, Modi tweeted, “Had a productive meeting with Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli in Bangkok. India attaches immense priority to relations with Nepal.” Yet the sentiment expressed online has not translated into substantive action.

Oli, speaking to reporters in the Airport upon his return from Bangkok, maintained optimism. He attributed delays in his visit to India to scheduling conflicts rather than disinterest. But his reassurances have done little to dispel the perception that New Delhi is indifferent to Kathmandu’s diplomatic overtures.

Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli’s long-anticipated meeting with his Indian counterpart, Narendra Modi, in Bangkok on April 4 appears to have fallen flat. Despite Oli’s participation in the sixth BIMSTEC summit, his strained relationship with New Delhi shows little improvement. Speaking at the Himalayan Dialogue’s inauguration, Oli delivered sharp remarks hinting at deteriorating ties. “If a neighbor intends to eat another’s paddy, it cannot be called neighborly relations,” he declared, advocating for non-alignment. Oli’s sharp criticism betrayed a sense of frustration, making it evident that had the meeting gone well, he would have praised Modi rather than airing grievances publicly.

India’s lukewarm approach stems in part from mistrust and concerns over Nepal’s increasing engagement with China, particularly through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). For New Delhi, the BRI represents a strategic challenge, complicating its view of Nepal as a reliable ally. The resulting indifference from India has left Nepal caught in a geopolitical tug-of-war, forced to balance its ties with two powerful neighbors.

The India-Nepal relationship has long been marked by moments of warmth followed by periods of tension. Modi himself once championed a “neighborhood first” policy, emphasizing India’s commitment to its smaller neighbors. However, recent years have seen a shift, with India adopting a more assertive and transactional approach to regional diplomacy. In contrast, Oli has struggled to shed the perception of being too aligned with China as per Indian believed, a view reinforced by his earlier tenure as Prime Minister. This perception has only deepened India’s wariness, further complicating efforts to reset the relationship.

Nepal and India stand at a crossroads. For Oli, the challenge lies in demonstrating that his government can navigate the delicate balance between engagement with China and maintaining historical ties with India. For Modi, it is a question of whether he can transcend domestic political calculations and view Nepal as a partner rather than a geopolitical chess piece.
Both nations have much to gain from a more cooperative relationship. For Nepal, India remains a critical partner for trade, transit, and energy. For India, Nepal’s stability is essential for its regional security. But trust cannot be rebuilt through perfunctory meetings or hollow declarations.

The Bangkok and New York summits were missed opportunities to chart a new course. As the two leaders look to the future, their ability—or inability—to overcome mistrust and find common ground will determine the trajectory of one of South Asia’s most complex bilateral relationships. Until then, the icy silence between Nepal and India continues, reflecting a diplomatic impasse that neither side can afford to sustain indefinitely.

Despite multiple secret delegations and diplomatic overtures from Nepal, India remains reluctant to trust Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli, keeping bilateral relations at arm’s length. Even mediation by the Nepali Congress, paired with assurances of restraint, has failed to ease New Delhi’s skepticism. Oli’s ties with India now appear trapped in a diplomatic deadlock, teetering on the brink of irreparability. Diplomacy, while often an art of the possible, thrives on trust and adaptability—qualities absent in the current impasse. As Oli’s unpredictable relationship with India unfolds, the outcome remains uncertain: will it stabilize or spiral into a complete breakdown?

Oli and India: from trusted ally to strategic rival

For decades, Prime Minister and Nepal’s Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist Leninist (UML) Chairman KP Sharma Oli maintained a reputation as one of India’s most trusted political allies in Nepal. His relationship with India was not just cordial but deeply interwoven with pivotal moments in Nepal’s modern history. From championing the Mahakali Treaty in 1996 to playing a significant role in the peace process that brought the Maoists into the political mainstream, Oli was seen as an influential figure aligned with India’s interests and friendship.

The evolution of the Oli-India relationship is a microcosm of Nepal’s broader struggle to assert its sovereignty while navigating the competing interests of its powerful neighbors. From a trusted ally to a strategic rival, Oli’s journey reflects the complexities of Nepal-India relationship, where historical ties are often overshadowed by contemporary challenges.

As Nepal continues to grapple with its geopolitical realities, the story of KP Sharma Oli and India serves as a reminder of the delicate balance required to sustain relationships in an increasingly polarized world. Yet, this seemingly unshakable alliance underwent a dramatic transformation, evolving into a complex dynamic marked by suspicion, tension, and strategic maneuvering. Today, the Oli-India relationship is emblematic of the shifting geopolitical landscape in South Asia, where traditional alignments are increasingly challenged by new strategic realities.

KP Oli’s political ascent coincided with a period when India held significant sway over Nepal’s political framework. In 1996, the Mahakali Treaty—a contentious water-sharing agreement with India—became a litmus test for Nepal-India relations. Within the UML, the treaty sparked fierce debates. While many opposed it, Oli vocally supported the agreement, positioning himself as a pragmatic leader with a vision of regional cooperation.

Oli’s alignment with India continued into the early 2000s. His support was instrumental during the peace process that ended Nepal’s decade-long Maoist insurgency. Behind the scenes, Oli worked closely with Indian diplomats to broker the 12-point agreement that laid the groundwork for the Maoists’ integration into Nepal’s democratic framework.

Even as internal political rivalries unfolded—such as when Oli supported Madhav Kumar Nepal’s rise to Prime Ministership in 2009 despite initial reservations—his relationship with India remained largely positive. India, in turn, saw Oli as a stabilizing figure within Nepal’s turbulent political landscape.

The turning point in Oli-India relations came during Nepal’s constitution-making process in 2015. Following the devastating earthquake, Nepal’s political parties intensified efforts to draft and promulgate a new constitution. This endeavor, however, clashed with India’s strategic interests.

The constitution’s provisions, particularly regarding federalism and representation of Madhesh-centric parties, sparked significant discontent among certain groups in Nepal’s southern plains. India, aligning itself with these parties, pressured Nepal’s leaders to delay the constitution.

Indian Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar’s high-profile visit to Kathmandu as Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s special envoy underscored the urgency with which India sought to influence the process. Jaishankar met Oli at his residence, urging him to halt the constitution’s promulgation for few days. Oli, however, remained defiant, stating unequivocally that the constitution-making process would proceed as planned.

This marked a watershed moment. For the first time, Oli openly resisted India’s influence. When Nepal’s political leadership collectively rebuffed India’s demands, the relationship between Oli and India soured irreversibly. During that meeting, Congress and UML top leaders were busy blaming one another, with urging the UML to align and show readiness for cooperation. But K.P. Sharma Oli, unflinchingly direct, dismissed the notion—an act that angered India. His defiance signaled to New Delhi that its influence was being sidelined, with Oli emerging as the obstacle to its diplomatic aspirations.

India’s response to Nepal’s defiance was swift and severe. In the wake of the constitution’s promulgation, India imposed an unofficial blockade, citing security concerns due to unrest in the Madhesh region. The blockade, however, was widely perceived in Nepal as an act of economic coercion aimed at punishing the country for asserting its sovereignty.

For Oli, the blockade became an opportunity to redefine his political identity. He emerged as a nationalist leader, rallying Nepali citizens against what was seen as India’s overreach. The UML, under Oli’s leadership, capitalized on growing anti-India sentiment, strengthening its position as a defender of Nepal’s independence.

At the same time, Oli began deepening ties with China. During his tenure as Prime Minister, he signed agreements with Beijing to enhance trade, infrastructure development, and connectivity. The shift towards China further strained Oli’s relationship with India, which viewed these developments as a challenge to its traditional influence in Nepal.

India’s unease with Oli’s growing assertiveness extended into Nepal’s internal politics. After Oli’s government was toppled in 2016, Indian diplomacy reportedly played a role in the formation of a coalition led by Maoist leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda). This move was perceived by the UML as an attempt to isolate Oli and limit his influence.

Oli’s response was calculated. Despite the setback, he worked to consolidate his position within the UML and strengthen his ties with China. By the time of Nepal’s general elections in 2017, Oli had formed a Left Alliance with the Maoists, effectively sidelining Indian-backed political factions. The alliance’s landslide victory signaled a significant shift in Nepal’s political landscape, with Oli emerging as a dominant figure.

Attempts at reconciliation

When KP Sharma Oli first became Prime Minister of Nepal, he embarked on a mission to repair the strained relationship with India. He began by dispatching trusted emissaries, including Pradeep Gyawali, the party secretary, as his special envoy. Despite Gyawali’s efforts, the overtures failed. Oli then sent Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Kamal Thapa, only to face the same outcome. Undeterred, delegations led by figures like Binod Chaudhary, Arjun Prasad Bastola, and Arjun Karki were also sent to India in an attempt to thaw the icy relations. Yet, these attempts fell short of yielding tangible results.

The challenges were compounded by Nepal’s internal dynamics. Efforts to establish trust were undermined by a lack of confidentiality—information shared with Indian counterparts often leaked back into Nepal, further irritating Indian officials. The economic blockade imposed by India had already exacerbated the plight of the Nepali people, creating an atmosphere of urgency.

It was only after Himal Thapa, then Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) of the Nepali Army, visited India that the situation began to shift. His efforts, along with those of Army Chief Rajendra Kshatriya and others, sought to mend ties through Indian military. The army’s initiative indicated a willingness to bypass political tensions in favor of practical collaboration. Eventually, the Madhesi parties, whose political movements had coincided with the blockade, withdrew their protests, and the blockade was lifted.

Oli’s visit to India following the blockade’s resolution was anticipated as a turning point. Instead, it highlighted deeper rifts. Oli resisted India’s main agenda for the trip, further cooling relations. His subsequent visit to China a month later, during which he signed several strategic agreements, sent shockwaves through India. For India, the overtures to Beijing represented a shift in Nepal’s foreign policy orientation, fueling mistrust.

During his meetings with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Oli openly addressed India’s discomfort, stating that his government sought to cultivate long-term ties with China. These agreements, seen as provocative, marked a pivotal moment in deteriorating relations.

Back in Nepal, the fallout from Oli’s India-China balancing act began to unfold. The Maoist chairman, Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda), withdrew his support for Oli’s government. With backing from the Madhesi parties and the Nepali Congress, Prachanda replaced Oli as Prime Minister. Oli, however, attributed his ouster to Indian interference and openly expressed his grievances in public forums, further straining relations.

The Madhesi movement also played a significant role in shaping Oli’s public image. While the agitation portrayed Oli as an anti-Madhesh figure, it simultaneously bolstered his image as a nationalist leader in the eyes of hill and mountain constituencies. This dual narrative fueled Oli’s political resurgence in local elections, where he won significant support in the hills but struggled in Madhesh.

The interplay between India and Oli became a defining feature of his tenure. Oli’s nationalist rhetoric often positioned him in opposition to perceived Indian overreach. In turn, India’s actions, including the blockade and support for the Madhesi movement, reinforced this dynamic.

Ultimately, Oli’s tenure exemplifies the delicate balancing act of Nepali foreign policy—a small nation navigating its sovereignty amidst the competing interests of its powerful neighbors.
Despite the deep rift, both Oli and India have made efforts to mend ties. Following his re-election as Prime Minister, Oli extended an olive branch to India, emphasizing the need for cooperation. In a letter to Modi, he expressed a willingness to rebuild the relationship.

India, too, recognized the importance of engaging with Oli. External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj’s visit to Kathmandu in early 2018 was seen as a goodwill gesture aimed at resetting bilateral ties. During her visit, Swaraj prioritized meetings with Oli, signaling India’s acknowledgment of his pivotal role in Nepal’s politics. However, the reconciliation efforts were fraught with challenges. Oli’s simultaneous engagement with China complicated matters, as India struggled to counter Beijing’s growing influence in Nepal.

From bad to worse: the deterioration of Oli-India relations:

Oli and India have deep mutual distrust that has transformed their dynamic into one of strategic rivalry. India believed Oli’s tilt towards China, spread anti-Indian rhetoric, coupled with his nationalist rhetoric, has positioned Nepal as a key player in the India-China rivalry in the Himalayan region. At the same time, Oli has sought to maintain a delicate balance. His overtures to India indicate a pragmatic recognition of the need for cooperation with both neighbors. However, the scars of past confrontations linger, shaping the interactions between Oli and Indian leaders.
The Nepal Communist Party, formed in May 2018, symbolized a historic communist moment in Nepal’s political landscape. With KP Sharma Oli and Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda) as its chairs, the unified party appeared poised to dominate Nepal’s politics. However, what began with promises of unity quickly devolved into deep rivalry, with internal power struggles and ego clashes bringing the party to its knees.

Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli, embroiled in party infighting, began attributing the crisis to foreign interference, particularly from India. As the conflict escalated, Oli launched public attacks against India, accusing it of meddling in Nepal’s affairs. At a time when the world was grappling with the COVID-19 pandemic, these tensions further soured Nepal-India relations, which had already begun to deteriorate at a people-to-people level.

Oli’s rhetoric and actions increasingly antagonized India, with his statements perceived as targeting the very core of the BJP’s beliefs, particularly on religious matters. India felt that Oli’s remarks struck at the heart of its ideological identity, deepening the divide between the two nations.

Meanwhile, the internal divisions within the Nepal Communist Party only grew worse. Oli and Prachanda’s conflicting personalities fractured the party, ultimately leading to its split into three different factions within three years. Senior leader Madhav Kumar Nepal broke away to form a socialist party, while the once-dominant communist alliance crumbled, handing power back to the opposition Nepali Congress.

The much-celebrated merger between the CPN-UML and the CPN-MC, which had brought together nearly all strands of Nepal’s communists, disintegrated as Oli and Prachanda’s rivalry reached its peak. What started as a promise of a unified political future for Nepal ended in disarray, with Oli’s leadership further strained by his deteriorating relationship with India.
The fallout left Nepal’s political landscape fragmented, with the Nepali Congress unexpectedly emerging as the ruling party. For Oli, his tenure marked not just the collapse of communist unity but also a period of strained relations with India that defined his time in power.

Under Oli’s leadership, Nepal’s ties with India have reached a historic low. The combination of territorial disputes, inflammatory rhetoric, and controversial policies has left a deep rift, reshaping the dynamics between the two neighbors. While Oli’s tenure may be defined by his attempts to assert Nepal’s sovereignty, it has come at the cost of a once-robust bilateral relationship.
New map soured relations with India:

In May 2020, Nepal promulgated a new political map that added 335 square kilometers to its territory, increasing the total area from 147,181 to 147,516 square kilometers. The new map included territories of Kalapani, Lipulekh, and Limpiyadhura, a move endorsed by Nepal’s Council of Ministers and passed by the House of Representatives. Enshrined into Nepal’s constitution, the map was viewed by India as an “artificial expansion,” marking a sharp escalation in tensions.

Indian media attributed Nepal’s actions to influence from China, interpreting the map’s release as a strategic maneuver. However, in Nepal, the move was widely celebrated, passing both houses of parliament through a constitutional amendment. This divergence of narratives fueled animosity, with India expressing deep irritation.
Oli’s remarks on “Singhamev Jayate” deepen the rift:

Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli further strained relations with controversial remarks made in Parliament on June 20, 2020. Referring to India’s national emblem and motto, he questioned whether it was “Satyamev Jayate” (Truth alone triumphs) or “Singhamev Jayate” (The lion alone triumphs). His comments on the symbol of India were met with sharp criticism in Indian media, which painted him as increasingly aligned with China.

Adding fuel to the fire, Oli suggested that the strain in Nepal-India relations was compounded by a “tougher” strain of coronavirus from India, comparing it unfavorably to those originating from other countries. These remarks were widely reported in India as evidence of Oli’s antagonism, further alienating Indian public opinion.

Oli’s accusations of Indian interference:

Oli’s accusations that India was attempting to remove him from office added another layer of tension. Speaking at a program in Kathmandu, he implied without directly naming India that external forces were conspiring to destabilize his government with clearly indicated to the India. This claim was not well-received, even within his own ruling Nepal Communist Party (NCP), with senior leaders demanding his resignation.

The party’s co-chair, Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda), strongly objected to Oli’s allegations. The resulting discord within the party paralleled the worsening Nepal-India relationship, creating political instability on multiple fronts.

Oli’s claim on Ram’s birthplace in Nepal strikes at the heart of India’s religious sentiments:

Oli’s claim that the birthplace of Lord Ram, Ayodhya, was actually located in Thori, Chitwan, Nepal, not India, sparked outrage across the border. Speaking during a program at his official residence, he stated, “Ayodhya is a village a Thori, little west of Birgunj, not the Ayodhya of India.” The remark drew sharp condemnation from Indian religious leaders and politicians, forcing Nepal’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs to clarify that the statement was not intended to be political.

India’s Unease with the UML-Congress alliance

India’s efforts to stabilize Nepal’s political landscape through a Congress-UML coalition under Sher Bahadur Deuba took an unexpected turn in 2022. Oli’s maneuvers—supporting Prachanda’s rise as Prime Minister and later forming alliances to reclaim power—left New Delhi feeling betrayed.

India’s discomfort with the Congress-UML alliance, which derailed its tacit preference for a fragmented post-election government, is increasingly evident. The prospect of K.P. Sharma Oli regaining power with a near two-thirds majority has only deepened New Delhi’s unease. While not overtly opposing the alliance, India’s cool indifference speaks volumes—it has avoided meaningful engagement, maintained a frosty rapport with Nepal’s leadership, and repeatedly ignored Prime Minister Oli’s invitations, despite Foreign Minister Arzu Rana’s persistent diplomatic overtures. Adding to the strain is Rana’s central role in advancing Nepal’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) agreement, further complicating already tense bilateral relations.

The strain visibly seen when Deuba abruptly canceled his visit to the “Kumbh Global Summit” in Prayagraj, UP, citing logistical issues. Insiders, however, point to the lack of high-level meetings with Indian leaders as the real reason. India views the UML-Congress alliance as a disruption to its influence in Nepal, further complicated by Oli’s nationalist stance and ties with China. The political shifts have widened the rift, reflecting growing mistrust between the two neighbors.

Nepal’s BRI gamble: tensions at the Chicken’s Neck

As relations with India soured and the prospect of an official visit to New Delhi faded, Nepal’s Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli turned his gaze northward. In December 2024, seven years after Nepal signed the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Oli visited Beijing to take the next significant step. The visit culminated in the signing of the “Framework for Belt and Road Cooperation,” officially announced in a joint statement on December 4.

This move came against a backdrop of growing unease from India, particularly concerning the strategic implications of BRI projects near its vulnerable Siliguri Corridor, famously known as the “Chicken’s Neck.” This narrow stretch of land, spanning approximately 20-22 kilometers, connects India’s mainland to its northeastern states, making it a critical security concern.

The framework’s text, prepared by a joint task force of Oli’s CPN-UML and the Nepali Congress, underscored an unusual alignment between political rivals. Congress General Secretary Gagan Thapa and team also involved in the agreement further alienated New Delhi. These moves also deepened the fractures in Nepal-India relations. The ambitious vision of connecting Nepal’s eastern region with Chinese infrastructure was seen in India as a provocation rather than an opportunity for collaboration.

Nepal-India relations under Oli and navigating future

The relationship between Nepal and India under Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli has entered a complex phase. With India taking a cautious stance and avoiding deep engagement in Nepal’s political landscape, the future of bilateral ties hangs in uncertainty. As New Delhi watches the shifting sands of Kathmandu’s political alliances, Oli’s tenure may bring new challenges and recalibrate the dynamic between the two neighbors.

India appears reluctant to closely engage directly with Nepal’s volatile political environment, characterized by fleeting coalitions and instability. New Delhi has refrained from influencing significant political courses in Kathmandu but remains vigilant. Should it perceive heightened insecurity or a growing Chinese footprint in Nepal, India may be prompted to recalibrate its approach.

Currently, India’s engagement with Nepal hinges on its trusted relationship with the Nepali Congress, albeit selectively, depending on individual leaders. If the Congress sustains the current government, India may cautiously extend its cooperation for a limited time. However, any realignment or shift in Congress’s stance could pave the way for new political alliances.
Prime Minister Oli’s role in India’s foreign policy framework is marked by skepticism. While India may comfortable fostering ties with the Nepali Congress, Maoists, and smaller parties, Oli’s leadership is viewed with caution. His tenure raises concerns in New Delhi, especially regarding his foreign policy and security stances.

A key concern for India is the extent of Chinese involvement in Nepal under the current government. If Beijing’s economic and strategic engagements in Nepal intensify, India may consider countermeasures to safeguard its interests. New Delhi is wary of Nepal becoming a tool for Beijing’s regional ambitions, particularly through infrastructure investments and political collaborations.

China’s growing footprint in Nepal’s economy and politics has raised alarm in India and among Western powers. The potential merger of Nepal’s two major communist parties—engineered by Beijing—could further complicate the geopolitical equation. Such a merger might consolidate a left-leaning bloc in Nepal, raising concerns for India and other regional stakeholders.
India could respond by exploring options to counter Beijing’s influence. For instance, informal alliances within the Nepali Congress, Maoists, and smaller parties could be forged to weaken the left bloc. Additionally, preemptive moves—such as government under congress leadership or changing Congress’s parliamentary leadership if Deuba not ready to do so or forming alternative coalitions under the Maoist leadership—might be on the table to avert a unified communist front.

India’s discomfort with China’s rapid investment and infrastructure expansion in Nepal is rooted in fears of politicization. India believes Beijing’s growing presence in Kathmandu’s political corridors threatens to reshape Nepal’s foreign policy, potentially tilting it toward China. India remains watchful of how the current government navigates these pressures, especially in sensitive areas like security and economic collaboration.

New Delhi recognizes the temptation to label Nepali leaders as “friends” or “enemies” can backfire. However, its strategic interests require a delicate balance—isolating Oli personally while maintaining broader engagement with Nepal. This nuanced approach reflects India’s intent to protect its regional influence without overt interference.
India and Nepal share deep geographical, cultural, and historical ties. Since India’s independence, their relationship has been a cornerstone of New Delhi’s regional strategy. While largely free from major disputes, the relationship has faced challenges, often resolved through mutual dialogue.

Nepal’s ongoing political transition adds another layer of complexity. Emerging forces and a younger generation are reshaping the country’s socio-political landscape, influencing its relations with India. These changes are significant not only for Nepal’s future but also for the bilateral dynamic.

The coming weeks and months will be critical in determining the trajectory of Nepal-India relations. Oli’s leadership and his handling of foreign policy will play a pivotal role. If he continues to pursue policies that prioritize Nepal’s non-alignment while balancing relations with India and China, tensions could ease. However, if geopolitical pressures intensify, the relationship may head toward a prolonged period of unpredictability.

For now, New Delhi remains cautious, watching Nepal’s political developments unfold. Its willingness to engage more closely will depend on how Kathmandu navigates its internal dynamics and manages its external alignments. The future of Nepal-India relations under Oli remains an open question, one shaped by regional rivalries, domestic politics, and the enduring challenge of balancing competing interests.